Alexandra Brown-Garnier

''Note: This page has not been completed. More sections will be added eventually in order to finish the page.'' Alexandra Brown-Garnier (born May 10, 1963) is a Canadian politician, lawyer, jurist, analyst, activist, and environmentalist. She started her career as a lawyer and worked as a legal analyst for Le Monde, a French daily afternoon newspaper, where she provided analysis of several key rulings such as R. v Morgentaler, and later ran for a seat in the House of Commons in the 1997 federal election in the province of Ontario. Brown-Garnier is one of the most respected figures in Canadian politics to more left-leaning individuals due to her support for abortion rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and protection of the environment.

Province of Dakota v Brown-Garnier
As the Federal Government passed Bill C-34 "Common Sense Act" which implemented a 20 weeks abortion ban with several exceptions, the province of Dakota later passed its own bill to restrict abortion rights, with a 6 weeks abortion ban with the exceptions of rape and incest. Brown-Garnier simultaneously launched a lawsuit against both bills, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the bills on the precedent of R v Morgentaler. Both lawsuits were seized by the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada reached a decision on Province of Dakota v Brown-Garnier first.

Brown-Garnier's lawsuit stated the following: May it please the Court, the Act in question before you now should be summarily overturned on the grounds it infringes on the right of a woman to decide whether she wants to terminate a pregnancy or not.

The provincial government of Dakota passed in the end of the year 1995 a bill to restrict the access to abortion for women until the sixth weeks of pregnancy, with the sole exception if the life of the mother is at risk.

''This bill clearly defies the landmark ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada “R v Morgentaler”. This decision allowed women to get an abortion, and revoked the licence that was necessary for a medical facility to perform abortions. Today, the bill in question in Dakota infringes the right of a woman to choose whether she wants to terminate her pregnancy or not. It endangers her security and well-being, while also restricting her ability to choose for herself what decision she thinks is the best for her. As Justice Wilson argued in the landmark “R v Morgentaler”, abortion is about way more than a medical act performed by a doctor, it has a social and ethical weight in society. This bill in Dakota does not let women decide for themselves what decision they want to take. It infringes on their freedom, that should be entirely theirs for such decisions where the government does not need to intervene with its own judgement. It hinders the ability of women to make their own decisions over their very own body, and hinders their ambitions, priorities and aspirations as free women living in a free and democratic country.''

''Additionally, the Court shall consider how the bill in question endangers the health and lives of women in Canada, for their safety and well-being. The bill in question offers one unique exception that applies if the life of the mother is in danger. It does not consider any exceptions for the cases of rape, incest, complications in the pregnancy, mental health and their overall well-being to ensure that they can carry this pregnancy until the birth of their child. As a country, and as a Nation, it should be the priority of the government and of its institutions at all scales of governance to ensure the security of women, and their freedom, with their ability to pursue happiness. The interference of the province of Dakota in the rights of women to get an abortion or not clearly does not ensure the safety that women need, and completely ignores the precedent of “R v Morgentaler”.''

Lastly, such restrictions taken at the provincial level can also question the principle of equal justice under the law, as this law would generate inequalities in the access for abortion clinics in the province of Dakota, with communities in need that would not be able to afford to get an abortion in another province, while richer individuals would be able to do so.

May the Court strike down this law on the basis it restricts the rights of women to get an abortion, therefore limiting their freedom and bodily autonomy, endangering their safety and instilling the judgement of a governmental authority over such a complex social, personal and ethical question that should be left to individuals in a free and democratic society. Brown-Garnier's lawsuit paused the enforcement of the law made by the Dakotan provincial government while the bill was in contention at the Supreme Court. In a 7-2 Decision, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled for Brown-Garnier, arguing that the bill violated the precedent of R v Morgentaler of 1988. This vote replicated the 1988 vote of the Supreme Court of Canda on R v Morgentaler. This was a victory for Brown-Garnier, allowing her to gain in name recognition and in popularity among left-wing voters.

R v Brown-Garnier
In the 35th Parliament, Bill C-34 "Common Sense Act" was passed by the House of Commons and received royal assent. The Bill, authored my MP Rick Farmer of Iowa, a Conservative, introduced a 20 weeks abortion ban with exceptions for rape, incest, the mother's life is in danger, if the mother is under 18, or if the mothr is above 45. It was initially unclear whether a lawsuit would be introduced. Green Lawyer Alexandra Brown-Garnier introduced a lawsuit that the Supreme Court agreed to consider. It was introduced on the basis that the bill ignored the precedent of R v Morgentaler ruled in 1988 by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Brown-Garnier's Lawsuit stated the following: May it please the Court, the Act in question before you now should be summarily overturned on the grounds it infringes on the right of a woman to decide whether she wants to terminate a pregnancy or not.

The Federal Government of Canada, in the year 1995, passed the Bill C-34, which restricted abortions from being provided after 20 weeks of pregnancy, along with numerious exceptions, namely, rape, incest, a danger to the mother’s life, the mother is under 18, and lastly, the mother is over 45.

''This bill is in contradiction to the historic ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada “R v Morgentaler”. This decision allowed women to get an abortion, and revoked the licence that was necessary for a medical facility to perform abortions. Justice Wilson argued that abortions are a much more profound issue than a medical one, one that is also ethical and social. This decision is complex and it should be up to women to make that decision given the consequences that would result in the incapability of getting the abortion. The issue is deeper than the act in question, and the bill issues an opinion, formulates a judgement and the federal government therefore replace the decisions of women to get an abortion after the deadline set in the bill. In a free and democratic society like ours, it should be up to individuals to decide freely for themselves what is best for their security and their well-being.''

''This bill should also be considered as it can hinder the ability of women to make their own decisions and hinder their own priorities and aspirations as a person. Bill C-34 does not consider factors that could worsen the pregnancy without directly endangering the life of the mother. The mental health and well-being of the mother is not considered, while such issues could worsen the pregnancy and lead the mother to not be in a proper situation to give birth and to heal from her own mental health issues. Additionally, complications that do not endanger the life of the mother, outside of mental health, can happen at any time during a pregnancy, and those medical conditions, while effectively not endangering the life of the mothers, could lead them to reconsider their pregnancy. This decision should fall upon the mother, not upon the federal government. The interest of the state to protect the women and the mothers is greater than the one to protect fetuses, which are not a legal entity during the pregnancy.''

The Federal Government, by setting up such a deadline, effectively imposed an arbitrary opinion to decide over the bodies of women that question their bodily autonomy and their own freedom to choose for themselves as this question is deeply personal, and connects to deeper questions linked to social and ethical judgements which should fall upon women to decide in a free and democratic society. As the lawsuit was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada, the enforcement of the bill was paused. In a 5 - 4, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in favour of the crown, arguing that the precedent of R v Morgentaler did not suggest restrictions were not allowed. As the bill was upheld, the Supreme Court of Canada regardless added 2 new exceptions to the bill, when the life of the fetus is in danger, or when the pregnancy can lead to dire economic circumstances. Initially considered a blow to Brown-Garnier's legal career, it become more of a mixed bag, with a case that was difficult, and that at least managed to add 2 new exceptions of the bill. This lawsuit contributed to the rise of Brown-Garnier as a political icon in Canada as a staunchly pro-choice lawyer and politician. After the bill was upheld, Brown-Garnier affirmed that the "fight isn't over" and called for the formal repeal of Bill C-34.

Egan v Canada
To be added.

Brown-Garnier's Lawsuit stated the following: May it please the Court, the Act in question before you now should be summarily revised on the grounds it violates Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which requires equal treatment under the law.

''James Egan and John Nerris Nesbit have been in a conjugal relationship since 1948. As James Egan retired at age 65 in 1986, and when his partner, John Nerris Nesbit also turned 65, they applied to a spousal allowance by the Department of National Health and Welfare. However, this request was refused by the aforementioned Department on the basis that the word “spouse” did not include a same-sex couple and therefore was not eligible to a spousal allowance.''

''This definition of “spouse” in the Act only includes only couples that are not of the same-sex. By denying the request, the Department of National Health and Welfare denied them this spousal allowance because of their sexual orientation, infringing on their right to equal treatment under the law affirmed in Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The definition of spouse in the Act in question is discriminatory, and creates a difference in treatment, contrary to the principle of equal treatment under the law.''

''While the word “spouse” in nature does not offer any judgement of sex or sexual orientation, the definition of the bill deliberately excludes same-sex couples from those spousal allowances. The term in itself is not discriminatory in theory, but the definition applied by the Act makes it discriminatory in practice. It is a case of adverse effect discrimination that impacts the group in question only in practice, ignoring the theoretical nature of the word, that does not offer any ground to sex or sexual orientation.''

''The precision of “opposite sex” in the definition of “spouse” clearly excludes on the ground of the sexual orientation of the applicants. Arguing that not only homosexual individuals could get involved in same-sex relationships, while objectively true, still denies them systemically the possibility of getting their application for a spousal allowance to be accepted.''

''Additionally, the distinction made by this definition is irrelevant to the original purpose of the legislation which was to alleviate poverty in elderly households. This distinction does not offer any change in the intent of the legislation and actually reduces its impact by discriminating same-sex couples.''

''This specified distinction between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples is therefore unconstitutional and violates the constitutional rights of James Egan and John Norris-Nesbit to deserve equal treatment under the law, regardless of their sexual orientation. May the Court affirm that any discrimination towards same-sex couples should be affirmed constitutionally under Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and review the definition of spouse as defined in the “Old Age Security Act”.'' To be added.

Egale Canada v Canada
In the 36th Parliament, the bill C-69 Religious Freedom Act initially failed to pass and was tabled. After reconsideration, the bill, introduced by MP Rick Farmer was passed and received royal assent. Before its introduction, the bill was already threatened of legal action by Brown-Garnier, qualifying the ability to refuse to provide their service to someone based on the seller's religious a "permission to discriminate". The bill would also allow persons with marrying powers to deny to offer their service based on their religious beliefs. The initial exceptions were race, gender, age, ethinicity and body type. As the lawsuit was introduced by Brown-Garnier, it highlighted the absence of 2 notable exceptions: religion and sexual orientation. As this was uncovered, MP Rick Farmer introduced an amendment to add the exception of religion, which was passed by te same 36th Parliament. This move legitimised the initial lawsuit that included this lack of exception on the religion part of the lawsuit. This move also drew a lot of criticism from Brown-Garnier that affirmed that Conservatives seized the opportunity of fixing one exception, deliberately ignoring sexual orientation. She would argue that it was still breaking the precedent set by Egan v Canada, that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is deemed unconstitutional.

Brown-Garnier's Lawsuit stated the following: May it please the Court, the Act in question before you now should be summarily overturned on the grounds it infringes on the precedent set by Egan v Canada, which ruled that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is illegal and unconstitutional, as it violates Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which requires equal treatment under the law and as it also infringes on the freedom of religion of Canadians, effectively creating yet another violation of Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

''The Act in question, “Bill C-69 - Religious Freedom Act”, allows individuals with marrying powers to refuse to marry individuals based on their religious beliefs. It also allows sellers to deny a customer to buy their product or service based on their religious beliefs. Those two provisions have the following exceptions: race, gender, ethnicity, age and body type. Sexual orientation is purposefully not included as an exception and therefore creates a difference of treatment between heterosexual persons and gay individuals. Purposefully or not, religion and religious beliefs are also not included in the exceptions of this bill, which would infringe on the freedom of religion and of belief of Canadians, but also, once again, create a difference of treatment between Canadian citizens based upon their religion or religious beliefs. One could refuse to serve a customer because they do not share the same religion, or the same religious beliefs.''

''This Bill is actually enshrining discrimination against Gay Canadians in Federal Law, allowing sellers or persons with marrying individuals to deny their goods or services from gay individuals under the sole justification of their religious beliefs. It constitutes a violation of Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which affirms that Canadians benefit from equal protection under the law without discrimination. The precedent set by Egan v Canada affirmed that sexual orientation is protected under Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This new bill is trying to weaken the legal precedence of the protection of Gay Individuals in Canada and clearly constitutes an infringement of their constitutional rights.''

''While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does grant Freedom of religion and the Freedom of belief in its first section, Canadian Law does not allow individuals to dictate or control the action of other individuals based on their religion as Bill C-69 would encourage. Whilst an individual may let their own actions be informed by their religion, it however does not provide them a right to discriminate others based on their sexual orientation or indeed, for any other reason; the victim of discrimination may not follow the same religion, if any, and thus would have their individual rights and freedoms be infringed upon in that case.''

Bill C-69 is actually offering a state-sponsored permission to discriminate Canadians based on their religious beliefs and on their sexual orientation, hidden behind the concept of “Religious Freedom”.

''Through Bill C-69, the Federal government effectively allowed discrimination to be enshrined in our laws, and imposed an arbitrary argument of “Religious Freedom” to justify such discrimination. In consequence, the Supreme Court of Canada should strike down Bill C-69 entirely and reaffirm the precedent of Egan v Canada, and lastly reassure that discrimination on the basis of religion is also illegal and unconstitutional.'' The lawsuit initiated by Brown-Garnier paused the enforcement of the law, while it was being considered by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Electoral record
To be added.